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Abstract—Deciding that two network flows are essentially
the same is an important problem in intrusion detection and
in tracing anonymous connections. A stepping stone or an
anonymity network may try to prevent flow correlation by adding
chaff traffic, splitting the flow in several subflows or adding
random delays. A well-known attack for these types of systems is
active watermarking. However, active watermarking systems can
be detected and an attacker can modify the flow in such a way
that the watermark is removed and can no longer be decoded.
This leads to the two basic features of our scheme: a highly-
optimized algorithm that achieves very good performance and a
passive analysis that is undetectable.
We propose a new passive analysis technique where detection is
based on Neyman-Pearson lemma. We correlate the inter-packet
delays (IPDs) from both flows. Then, we derive a modification to
deal with stronger adversary models that add chaff traffic, split
the flows or add random delays. We empirically validate the
detectors with a simulator. Afterwards, we create a watermark-
based version of our scheme to study the trade-off between
performance and detectability. Then, we compare the results with
other state-of-the-art traffic watermarking schemes in several
scenarios concluding that our scheme outperforms the rest.
Finally, we present results using an implementation of our
method on live networks, showing that the conclusions can be
extended to real-world scenarios.
Our scheme needs only tens of packets under normal network
interference and a few hundreds of packets when a number of
countermeasures are taken.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network attackers intentionally hide their identity to avoid
prosecution. A widely-used way of achieving this anonymity
is forwarding the traffic through a chain of compromised
hosts called stepping stones [1]. Tracing back the chain to the
source is a challenging problem due to the encrypted or even
anonymized connections between stepping stones. Deciding
that two flows are essentially the same can be applied to the
mentioned problem as well as in many other contexts, such as
tracing anonymous connections [2] or preventing congestion
attacks on anonymous networks [3].
There are two general approaches for finding correlated
flows: passive analysis and active watermarks. Passive analysis
schemes are based on correlating some characteristics of the
flows, such as packet timings or packet counts, without altering
such flows [4]–[6]. On the other hand, active watermarks
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actively modify the flow by delaying individual packets. Active
watermarks can be packet-based, embedding the watermark
on individual delays between packets [7], [8] or interval-
based, embedding the watermark in some properties of the
intervals [3], [9], [10].
Lately, most of the work has been focused on the design of
new active watermarking techniques, as they are considered
to be more efficient, obtaining lower error rates for flows of
the same length. All of them are designed with the idea of
being undetectable, as detection can lead to the stepping stone
or the anonymous network to modify the flow in such a way
that it it can no longer be detected. In spite of this, detecting
these watermarks has been shown to be feasible and not a hard
task [11], [12]. This allows an attacker, e.g. the stepping stone,
anonymous network, etc., to easily modify the timing of the
detected flow to prevent the correlation using techniques as
chaff packets, flow splitting, merging flows or adding random
delays.
Achieving a good performance for flow-correlation ap-
proaches is critical for two main reasons: first, to be able
to deal with flow modifications and other countermeasures,
and second, to ensure a minimum reliability, implying a small
probability of false positives. These two reasons lead to the
necessity of extremely accurate techniques to correlate flows
as provided by our scheme. Furthermore, we cannot rely on the
length of the sequence, as in many kinds of stealthy attacks,
the amount of traffic sent by the attackers or compromised
bots is very small.
We propose a passive traffic analysis technique that outper-
forms any of the state-of-the-art traffic watermarking schemes.
For instance, 21 packets separated at least 10 ms are enough
to correlate two flows, one in Virginia, the other in California,
correctly with probability 0.9861 when the false positive prob-
ability is fixed to 10−5 and no countermeasures are exerted.
The proposed method saves the inter-packet delays (IPDs) of
the flow and uses a detector based on the likelihood ratio test
(Neyman-Pearson lemma).
As IPDs are not robust against the insertion and drop of
packets, we develop a modification which is robust against
chaff packets, repacketization, flow splitting, and attacks that
add or remove packets from the flow. We also make it robust
against random delays under a maximum delay constraint.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
reviews previous schemes for correlating flows and techniques
for detecting active watermarks. In Section III we introduce
the notation that we follow and formally describe the model.
In Section IV we construct our detector. Section V validates its
performance using a simulator. Section VI proposes a modifi-
cation to ensure robustness against chaff traffic, flow splitting
and constrained random delays. In Section VII we create an
active watermark to study the trade-off between performance
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2and detectability. In Section VIII we compare our passive
scheme with existing algorithms in terms of error probability.
Section IX shows the result of a real implementation. Finally,
Section X summarizes our contribution.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
A. Passive analysis
Zang and Paxson [4] proposed to correlate the traffic by
measuring the time that both flows are in OFF (i.e., no
transmission) state. They achieve a large confidence when con-
nections are several minutes long (i.e., thousands of packets)
but not so much reliability on short connections. They do not
consider any alteration in the traffic. Donoho et al. [5] studied
what happens if the stepping stone modifies its flow to evade
detection with a maximum tolerable delay constraint. Then,
with large enough sequences, they can correlate the traffic
regardless of the modification. They use wavelets to separate
the short-term behavior from the long-term behavior, and use
the correlation on the latter. Blum et al. [6] studied stepping-
stone detection under a maximum tolerable delay constraint.
They count the difference between the number of packets in
both flows. When this difference goes over a certain value they
conclude that the flows are not correlated.
The common drawback of those three methods is that they
require a large number of packets to achieve an acceptable
performance. This number can be significantly reduced by
using active watermarks, which are discussed next.
B. Active watermarks
Wang and Reeves [7] proposed the first active flow wa-
termark. The watermark is embedded in the IPDs. They
first quantize the IPD and embed one bit of information by
adding half of the quantization step or not. They argue that
with sufficient redundancy (infinitely large watermark) the
watermark can always be detected even if a timing perturbation
is added to each packet. Hence, the drawback of this method
is the amount of packets needed to obtain a good performance.
Wang et al. [10] proposed an interval centroid based watermark
(ICB). They divide the time into intervals. In each interval they
embed one bit of the watermark; if the bit is 0 they send a
request in the first half of the interval, and if the bit is 1 they
do it in the second half. Each bit is decoded according to
which half of the interval the centroid falls in. Yu et al. [13]
proposed an interval watermark based on Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) communication techniques in order
to hide it. The DSSS signal is embedded by modifying the
traffic rate. This method again requires a long sequence.
Houmansadr et al. [8] proposed RAINBOW, a non-blind
watermark which is robust to packet drops and repacketization.
They record the IPD, then they embed the watermark by
modifying the IPDs by a different quantity (+a for 1, −a
for 0, or vice versa). The normalized correlation is used in
detection, and a selective correlation when dealing with added
and dropped packets. Houmansadr and Borisov [3] proposed
SWIRL (Scalable Watermark that is Invisible and Resilient
to packet Losses). The flow is divided into intervals: half of
them are used to determine the slots pattern and the other
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Fig. 1. System Model.
half are used to actually embed the watermark by delaying
packets so as they fall into certain slots. Pyun et al. [9]
proposed an interval-based watermark (IB) designed to resist
attacks that modify the number of packets, such as flow
splitting, chaff packets and repacketization. The information
is embedded in the difference between the number of packets
in two contiguous intervals. This method has the drawback of
being more detectable compared to the others.
All the methods discussed above have been shown to be
detectable, see next section. This would allow an attacker to
modify the known-watermarked flows in such a way that the
watermark is removed.
C. Detecting watermarks
Peng et al. [14] showed how a watermark can be detected
and replicated. They detect which packets do not come from
the assumed one-way packet delay distribution. Using that
information, they can recover the parameters of the watermark
algorithm thus being able to replicate it. Specifically, they
applied their attack against the watermark in [7].
Kiyavash et al. [15] discovered how one can detect not
only the watermark but also extract the parameters and the
key, with several network flows watermarked using the same
key. This attack is effective against most of the interval based
watermarks: ICB, DSS and IB. However, RAINBOW and
SWIRL are designed to be immune to this attack.
Luo et al [11] showed that any practical timing-based
traffic watermark causes noticeable alterations in the intrinsic
timing features typical of TCP flows, and so it can be easily
detected. Concretely, they propose metrics based on the round-
trip time (RTT), IPDs, and one-packet bursts, that can expose
IB, ICB, RAINBOW and SWIRL watermarks for any kind
of traffic: bulk or interactive. Lin and Hopper [12] proposed
more efficient ways to deal with passive detection than [11].
They also argued that security against passive detection is not
sufficient, as a stronger adversary that knows the previous flow
is feasible in many scenarios.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
This section introduces the notation we use and explains
how we correlate the flows to decide whether they are linked
or not.
Notation We use the following notation. Random variables
(r.v.) are denoted by capital letters (e.g., X), and their ac-
tual values by lower case letters (e.g., x). Sequences of n
random variables are denoted with a superscript (e.g., Xn =
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn)). The probability distribution function (pdf)
of a continuous random variable X is denoted by fX(x). When
no confusion is possible, we drop the subscript in order to
simplify the notation. The sample mean is denoted by x¯. We
3Random Variables
A PDV modification by an Attack
C IPD at the Creator
D IPD at the Detector
J PDV or Jitter introduced by the network
N Network delays
X Timing information at the creator
Y Timing information at the detector
W IPD modification by a Watermark
Parameters
L Original sequence length
M Matched sequence length
η Threshold for the likelihood-ratio test to reject H0
ρ Synchronization constant
γ Threshold to consider a packet as lost
PL Packet loss probability
PNL Probability of packet loss due to the network
PM Probability of not detecting a packet
S Number of subflows after a split
Amax Maximum delay constraint for an attacker
Wmax Maximum delay constraint for the watermark
TABLE I
RANDOM VARIABLES AND CONSTANTS USED.
summarize the name for each r.v. and parameters introduced
in the sequel in Table I.
A. System model
Figure 1 illustrates our system model. A flow of length L+1
packets, that we are interested in tracking, goes through a
certain link, termed “creator”, where we can measure its packet
timing information, XL+1. The ith inter-packet delay (IPD) at
the creator is defined as Ci = Xi+1 − Xi, i = 1, . . . L, and
these values are saved for later use in detection. This flow
continues through the network without any modification.
The “detector” is another link in which we can measure the
timing information, Y L+1 = XL+1 +NL+1, where Ni is the
network delay suffered by the ith packet. Then, the IPDs at
the detector are
Di = Yi+1 − Yi = Xi+1 −Xi +Ni+1 −Ni
= Ci + Ji, i = 1 . . . L (1)
where Ji = Ni+1 − Ni represents the packet delay variation
(PDV), also known as jitter.
By using the information of the actual values cL and dL,
the detector has to decide correctly if the two flows are linked.
Two flows are linked if they follow a common timing pattern
due to sharing the same source (i.e. the unencrypted payload is
the same). Formally, we can express this problem via classical
hypothesis testing with the following hypotheses:
H0: The flows are not linked.
H1: The flows are linked.
B. Performance Metrics
To measure performance, we use two metrics: the proba-
bility of detection (PD), which represents the probability of
deciding that the flows are linked when they actually are; and
the probability of false positive (PF ), which represents the
probability of deciding incorrectly that the flows are linked.
Formally, PD is the probability of deciding H1 when H1
holds, whereas PF is the probability of deciding H1 when
H0 holds.
Typically, performance is graphically represented using the
so-called ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves,
which represent PD vs. PF . In a practical setting, one fixes
a certain value of PF (that has to be very small if we want
to achieve a high reliability) and then measure PD (which we
would like to be as large as possible).
In order to compare different ROCs in a simple way, we use
the AUC (area under the ROC curve), a measure that takes a
value of 1 in the case of perfect detection and 0.5 in case
of random choice. The AUC is shown in the legend of each
graph.
IV. BASIC DETECTOR
In this section we derive our detector and model the
distributions of PDVs and IPDs as needed.
A. Detector construction
In order to obtain the best possible performance, we con-
struct the optimal detector, which is the likelihood ratio test.
Neyman-Pearson lemma proves that this test is the most
efficient one between two simple hypotheses [16]. Hence, our
detector chooses H1 when
Λ(dL, cL) =
L(H1|dL, cL)
L(H0|dL, cL) =
f(dL|cL, H1)
f(dL|cL, H0) > η. (2)
and H0 in the opposite case. L represents the likelihood
function and η is a threshold that we fix to achieve a certain
probability of false positive.
Recall from (1) that if H1 holds, then DL = CL + JL.
Conversely, if H0 holds, DL is a sequence with joint pdf
fDL(d
L).
For feasibility reasons, we constraint the detector to use
first-order statistics, discarding the information carried by
higher-order statistics. This is equivalent to assuming sample-
wise independence in the sequences JL and DL. In Section
V-B we quantify the impact of this assumption on perfor-
mance, comparing the real results with those that would be
obtained for independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
sequences. Under these assumptions, the likelihood ratio be-
comes
Λ(dL, cL) =
L∏
i=1
fJ(di − ci)
fD(di)
. (3)
Therefore, we need to model the PDVs and the IPDs, i.e.
determine fJ(j) and fD(d).
B. Modeling the packet delay variation
To model the distribution of the PDVs, we first measure
them in several real connections, then fit these data to some
candidate distributions and select the distribution that matches
best.
The measured delays are reported in [17]. This dataset
contains the delays between two hosts during 72 hours, and for
11 different scenarios. As it is customary, we separate these
4Source Dest. n¯ [ms] PNL
Sc1 CA-US NM-US 15.4 1.9 · 10−4
Sc2 OR-US NM-US 26.7 6 · 10−4
Sc3 VA-US NM-US 41.4 1.7 · 10−3
Sc4 ES NM-US 93.6 0
Sc5 IE NM-US 73.6 9.8 · 10−5
Sc6 JP NM-US 69.4 1.0 · 10−4
Sc7 AU NM-US 109.4 1.2 · 10−3
Sc8 BR NM-US 88.9 9.5 · 10−4
Sc9 SG NM-US 110.5 9.4 · 10−2
Sc10 VA-US CA-US 63.1 5 · 10−3
Sc11 NM-US NM-US 3117.2 0.16
TABLE II
BASIC STATISTICS OF THE MEASURED DELAYS.
j¯ [s] Var. [s2] Skew. Kurtosis
Sc1 1 · 10−10 1 · 10−4 0.02 83185
Sc2 −2 · 10−10 1 · 10−5 5.84 408
Sc3 −2 · 10−10 2 · 10−3 0.003 85187
Sc4 1 · 10−9 1 · 10−6 17.1 81139
Sc5 −7 · 10−9 3 · 10−6 3.81 622
Sc6 −2 · 10−9 6 · 10−5 0.78 71212
Sc7 2 · 10−8 2 · 10−5 −0.01 78821
Sc8 9 · 10−9 6 · 10−3 −10−5 19893
Sc9 2 · 10−8 4 · 10−6 4.41 620
Sc10 −8 · 10−9 3 · 10−4 2.37 22789
Sc11 −1 · 10−6 6 · 10−3 2.97 410
TABLE III
BASIC STATISTICS OF THE MEASURED PDV.
data into three subsets: training, validation and test, using 24
hours of data for each.
Scenarios 1 to 9 measure common Internet connections be-
tween two hosts. Scenario 10 models the delays of a stepping-
stone scenario, where a host in Oregon is retransmitting to a
host in California the flow coming from a host in Virginia.
Scenario 11 measures the delays associated with one instance
of the Tor network [18]. In order to get a general idea about
the connection scenarios, we show some basic information of
the hosts and the connections in Table II, where PNL is the
probability of packet loss and the source and destination are
represented with ISO 3166 codes [19].
From these measured delays we calculate the measured PDV
as ji = ni+1 − ni. The basic statistics from Table III imply
a nearly symmetric (i.e., small skewness) and leptokurtotic
distribution (i.e., sharp peak and heavy tail).
To construct the model, we make the same assumptions as
to build the test, i.e. an i.i.d. sequence. The candidate distribu-
tions were selected among the ones that have support on R and
possess the mentioned characteristics. The chosen distributions
are Cauchy, Gumbel, Laplace, Logistic and Normal. Their
pdfs are summarized in Table IV, where the indicator function
1[a,b](x) takes the value 1 when x ∈ [a, b], and is 0 otherwise.
We estimate the respective parameters using robust statis-
tics, to prevent that outliers affect the measures. These estima-
tors are based on the median and median absolute deviation
and calculated as explained in [20, Chapter 3]. Afterwards, we
measure the goodness of fit between the validation sequence
and the model using the square root of the Jensen-Shannon
divergence (JSD), DJS [21]. This is a metric for two proba-
bility densities P,Q, which is based on the Kullback-Leibler
Distrib. pdf
Cauchy f(x|µ, σ) = 1
piσ
(
1+( x−µ
σ
)2
)
Gumbel f(x|µ, σ) = 1
σ
exp
(
−x−µ
σ
− exp
(
−x−µ
σ
))
Laplace f(x|µ, σ) = 1
2σ
exp− |x−µ|
σ
Logistic f(x|µ, σ) = exp
(
− x−µ
σ
)
σ
(
1+exp
(
− x−µ
σ
))2
Normal f(x|µ, σ) = 1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
Exp. f(x|λ) = λ exp(−λx)1[0,∞)(x)
Pareto f(x|α, xm) = αx
α
m
xα+1
1[xm,∞)(x)
LogNor. f(x|µ, σ2) = 1
x
√
2piσ2
exp
(
− (log x−µ)2
2σ2
)
LogLog. f(x|α, β) = (β/α)(x/α)β−1
(1+(x/α)β)2
1[0,∞)(x)
Weibull f(x|γ, β) = γ
β
xγ−1 exp
(
−xγ
β
)
1[0,∞)(x)
TABLE IV
PDFS OF THE CANDIDATE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR PDV AND IPD.
Scenario Cau. Gum. Lap. Log. Nor.
Sc. 1 0.168 0.218 0.101 0.123 0.159
Sc. 2 0.156 0.201 0.157 0.150 0.171
Sc. 3 0.135 0.211 0.163 0.167 0.192
Sc. 4 0.294 0.369 0.252 0.270 0.296
Sc. 5 0.153 0.193 0.139 0.135 0.159
Sc. 6 0.203 0.174 0.152 0.120 0.130
Sc. 7 0.136 0.300 0.231 0.267 0.298
Sc. 8 0.168 0.307 0.195 0.261 0.308
Sc. 9 0.183 0.185 0.171 0.141 0.146
Sc. 10 0.227 0.384 0.340 0.364 0.384
Sc. 11 0.251 0.201 0.194 0.228 0.253
TABLE V
GOODNESS OF FIT OF THE CANDIDATE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR PDV.
divergence (KLD) as follows:
DJS(P,Q) =
√
1
2
(D(P ||M) +D(Q ||M)) (4)
where M = 12 (P +Q) is the mid-point measure, and D(·||·)
is the KLD, defined as
D(P,Q) =
∑
i∈P
fP (i) log
(
fP (i)
fQ(i)
)
(5)
Results from Table V show that no distribution stands out
above the rest, being the Laplace and the Cauchy distributions
the best fits.
The Laplacian is the most commonly used model for the jit-
ter, but Rio-Dominguez et al. [22] claimed that an alpha-stable
distribution models it better. Note that a Cauchy distribution
is a particular case of an alpha-stable distribution, but we do
not generalize it further, as we are interested in a close-form
pdf model.
The performance of the two possible detectors, based on
Laplace and Cauchy distributions, respectively, is evaluated in
Section V-B.
C. Modeling the Inter-Packet Delays
In many works it is assumed a Poisson model for the traffic
because of its desirable theoretical properties [23]. This model
implies that IPD times are an i.i.d. exponentially distributed
sequence. But Paxson et al. [24] have shown that this model
is not accurate in interactive applications.
5Set Flows Packets
SSH Train. 6447 14442323
SSH Val. 1128 2594550
SSH Sim. 714 16595655
HTTP Train. 1108909 356620487
HTTP Val. 208896 63982082
HTTP Sim. 1007545 322853437
TABLE VI
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IPD SETS.
We model the IPDs on both SSH and HTTP protocols.
As done in [24], we only take into account packets that are
separated at least by 10 ms, considering that if two packets are
separated by less than 10 ms they are subpackets of the same
packet. Therefore, the considered IPDs are lower bounded by
10 ms. We use the captures from Dartmouth College [25],
using the traces from Fall 03 as training set, Spring 02 as
validation set and Fall 01 as test set for the simulator. The
basic characteristics of these sets are shown in Table VI.
We estimate the parameters through maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) and measure the goodness of fit using
the square root of the JSD. The candidate distributions are:
Exponential, Pareto, Log-Normal, Log-Logistic, and Weibull.
Their pdfs can be seen in Table IV.
Results shown in Table VII confirm the findings of Paxson
et al., i.e., that the Pareto distribution is a better model for
interactive traffic. In non-interactive traffic such as HTTP, this
model also gives acceptable results. Therefore, we will assume
that
fD(d) = αx
α
md
−α−1
1[xm,∞)(d). (6)
D. Detector
Once we have a model for the IPD and PDV sequences, we
derive the likelihood test.
If Cauchy distributed PDVs are assumed, the test chooses
H1 when
Λ(dL, cL) =
L∏
i=1
(di)
α+1
piσαxαm
(
1 +
(
di−ci
σ
)2) > η (7)
and H0 otherwise.
In the case that a Laplace model for PDV is adopted, then
Λ(dL, cL) = exp
(
−
∑L
i=1 |di − ci|
σ
) (∏L
i=1 di
)α+1
(2σαxαm)
L
. (8)
V. PERFORMANCE
In this section we construct a simulator and present the
scenarios we use in the remaining of the paper. Afterwards,
we test the model assumptions and measure the performance
with different sequence lengths.
A. Simulator and Scenarios
Simulations are carried out in the following way. First, we
generate timing information at the creator using the IPD test
set, XL+11 . The purpose of this sequence is to evaluate the
performance when H1 holds. A delay is added to each packet
Creator Detector
Stepping
Stone
Fig. 2. Simulated Scenario A.
TOR
Client Web Server
Fig. 3. Simulated Scenario B.
using the measured delays from the test set (as explained in
the following paragraphs), obtaining Y L+11 . We generate a
second sequence Y L+10 , using the IPD test set; this sequence
has the purpose of evaluating the performance under H0.
Finally, we use the Test from (7) or (8), to obtain both
Λ(dL0 , c
L
1 ) and Λ(d
L
1 , c
L
1 ). This experiment is repeated 10
6
times, and for different values of η we obtain PD as the rate of
Λ(dL1 , c
L
1 ) > η, and PF as the rate of Λ(d
L
0 , c
L
1 ) > η. Note that
due to the number of runs, PF < 10−5 cannot be measured
and results of this order are not accurate.
The sequences are generated in the following way: we place
all the IPDs from the test set in an order-preserving list.
The starting point is randomly selected from the list and the
generated IPDs are the following L values.
For generating the delays, we used the test set as a list
with the delay every 50 ms. We select one value randomly
from the list that will be considered time 0 ms; the following
values will represent the delay at times 50 ms, 100 ms, and
so on. To obtain the delays at times where we do not have a
measure, we use linear interpolation.
The performance is evaluated in the two scenarios depicted
in Figures 2 and 3. Scenario A represents a stepping stone that
forwards SSH traffic inside the Amazon Web Services [26]
network. The creator, stepping stone and detector are EC2
instances located in Virginia, Oregon and California, respec-
tively. This example corresponds to tracing the source of
an attack that was launched from a compromised Amazon
instance. The simulated delays correspond to those of Scenario
10 in Section IV-B, where the standard deviation of the
network delay is 4 ms.
Scenario B simulates a web page accessed from Tor network
whose real origin is to be found, and where the creator will
be the web page and the detector the client. For instance,
this case can correspond to a company in whose forum an
anonymous insulting post has been placed using Tor and it
is to be known whether the source comes from an employee
within the company. The simulated delays correspond to the
measurements of Scenario 11 in Table V, where the standard
deviation of the network delay is 340 ms.
6Distribution Error SSH Par SSH Error HTTP Par HTTP
Exponential 0.756 λ = 5.46 0.758 λ = 12.69
Pareto 0.149 α = 0.86, xm = 10−2 0.247 α = 0.53, xm = 10−2
Log-Normal 0.627 µ = −1.14, σ2 = 1.43 0.723 µ = −0.40, σ2 = 4.02
Log-Logistic 0.343 α = 0.27, β = 1.77 0.508 α = 0.47, β = 0.95
Weibull 0.554 γ = 0.49, β = 0.81 0.591 γ = 0.40, β = 1.33
TABLE VII
MLE ESTIMATOR AND GOODNESS OF FIT OF THE CANDIDATE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR IPD.
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Cauchy Model (0.999565)
IID Cauchy−Based Detector (0.999847)
Real Cauchy−Based Detector (0.992742)
Laplace Model (0.999996)
IID Laplace−Based Detector (0.998054)
Real Laplace−Based Detector (0.991501)
Fig. 4. Impact of assumptions in Scenario A with L = 3.
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IID Cauchy−Based Detector (0.994646)
Real Cauchy−Based Detector ( 0.997503)
Laplace Model (0.999946)
IID Laplace−Based Detector (0.997523)
Real Laplace−Based Detector (0.996124)
Fig. 5. Impact of assumptions in Scenario B with L = 20.
B. Impact of our assumptions
In this section, we wish to quantify the impact of the
assumptions we have made, that is, the PDVs form an i.i.d.
Cauchy or Laplace sequence. To this end, we extend our
simulator to create 3 types of delays: first, according to the
model (Cauchy or Laplace), second as a random sample
from the data, and last, from the data maintaining the time
correlation. L = 3 is used for Scenario A and L = 20
for Scenario B. Results are shown in Figures 4 and 5. We
notice two details: first, that the Cauchy-based detector gives
slightly better performance than the Laplace under real data,
and second, that the independence of the PDVs previously
assumed slightly reduces the performance. In the sequel, we
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Fig. 6. Performance dependence with L in Scenario A.
just derive the expressions for a Cauchy-based detector. The
modification for a Laplace detector is rather straightforward.
C. Performance dependence on L
We want to evaluate how much performance is improved
when longer sequences are used. The result is depicted in
Figures 6 and 7. We can see that Scenario B, whose IPDs
have a larger variance because of the Tor network, needs
much longer sequences to achieve the same performance. For
instance, with fixed PF = 10−4, in Scenario A for L = 5 we
obtain PD = 0.8926. However, in Scenario B the L needed
for a comparable result is around 250, with which we obtain
PD = 0.8947. If we compare AUCs, in Scenario A with L = 5
we obtain 0.9955 while a similar result in Scenario B requires
a value of L between 10 and 25.
VI. ROBUST DETECTOR
The previous test does not take the existence of any coun-
termeasure into account. Attacks to timing correlation can be
exerted by introducing uncorrelated random delays, adding
chaff traffic or splitting the flow, making the Test in (7)
ineffective. In this section, we build a test that is robust to
these attacks. First, we deal with adding or removing packets
from the flow, and then with random delays.
A. Matching packets
Hitherto, we have assumed that there is a one-to-one relation
between the flows at the creator and the detector; i.e., no
packets are added or removed. This assumption is not nec-
essarily valid for every situation, not only due to the presence
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of an active attacker, but also as a result of many applications
that repacketize flows, changing the number of packets, for
instance, SSH tunneling [27].
To deal with packet addition and removal, we first choose
the most likely packet at the detector for each packet at the
creator. In the case that there is no packet likely enough, we
consider the creator packet as lost.
Given the ith packet at the creator, we match it with
the most likely jth packet at the detector, denoting this as
i→ j. Consequently, if ρ is a synchronization constant to be
discussed in Section VI-C, and γ is the threshold for which a
packet is considered lost, the condition for a match in the ith
packet is
|xi − (yj − ρ)| < |xi − (yk − ρ)|, ∀k 6= j, (9)
and to avoid considering it lost,
|xi − (yj − ρ)| < γ. (10)
Threshold γ should be large enough so that the probability
PM that a packet is wrongly considered lost is very small, for
instance, 10−6. Although this can lead to incorrectly matching
with another packet when the packet is indeed lost, the impact
on Test (11) of this mismatch is very small. Empirically, the
best performance we obtained for Scenario A is when γ ≈ 75
ms and when γ ≈ 7 s for Scenario B.
In practice, the standard deviation of the network delay can
be larger than some of the IPDs, especially in Scenario 2,
in which case the matching is likely to fail. The impact of
these matching errors is evaluated in Section VI-E. In the case
that most of the IPDs are smaller than the standard deviation
of the network delay, a better matching function is the one
used in [29]. This corresponds to the injective function that
minimizes the mean square error between xn and ym − ρ,
which has the drawback of a higher computational cost.
The matching process modifies the timing sequences to
xM+1 and yM+1, where M ≤ L, as the lost packets are
removed. Formally, we can define the new sequences as
xM+1 = {xi | ∃ j : i→ j}, and yM+1 = {yj | ∃ i : i→ j}.
B. Test robust to chaff and flow splitting
From (7), we can obtain a test robust to packet removal and
insertion as
Λ(dM , cM ) =PL
L−M ·
M∏
i=1
(
PL + (1− PL)·
(di)
α+1
piσαxαm
(
1 +
(
di−ci
σ
)2)
 , (11)
where PL is the probability that a packet at the creator cannot
be matched at the detector. This can be due to three reasons:
network loss with a probability PNL, lack of matching when
the packet appears, and flow splitting into S subflows by the
stepping stone, i.e., (S − 1)/S of the original packets are not
seen by the detector, as only one of the subflows traverses this
link. Therefore,
PL =
S − 1 + PNL + PM − PNLPM
S
≈ S − 1 + PNL + PM
S
(12)
C. Self-Synchronization
We have mentioned that ρ is a synchronization constant.
The detector can perform detection maximizing the value of
Λ(dM , cM ) with respect to ρ through an exhaustive search.
For instance, Figure 8 shows a detector trying values of ρ
using steps of 1 ms in the interval [0, 0.5] s. We can see that
the maximum Λ(dM , cM ) occurs when ρ ≈ n¯, as expected.
Recall that n¯ is the sample mean of the network delays.
D. Robust test against random delays
So far the situation where an attacker can inject random
delays has not been considered. Random delay injection is a
well-known technique for covert channel prevention and can
be easily implemented via buffering by attackers across their
step stones.
We assume that the attacker has the constraint of not being
able to delay any packet more than Amax seconds. Hence,
she can modify the PDV by a quantity A that falls in the
interval [−Amax, Amax]. As we do not know the distribution
of the attacker’s random delay, the detector assumes a uniform
distribution. Thus, the PDV at the decoder is J ′M = JM+AM ,
and
fJ′(j) =
1
2Amaxpi
(
(arctan
(
j +Amax
σ
)
− arctan
(
j −Amax
σ
))
(13)
Consequently, the likelihood ratio becomes
Λ(dM , cM ) =PL
L−M ·
M∏
i=1
(
PL + (1− PL)·
(di)
α+1fJ′(di − ci)
αxαm
)
(14)
A game-theoretic approach to this problem is taken in [28],
where for simplicity the detector is constrained to estimating
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Fig. 8. Synchronization in Scenario A with L = 5.
and compensating the attack. The optimal detector for the
same game is derived in [29], where it is shown that a nearly
deterministic attack impairs the detector more than a uniform
distribution even if the detector knows the attack distribution.
E. Performance
To evaluate the proposed robust algorithms, the functionali-
ties of adding chaff traffic, splitting the flow, and delaying the
packets randomly are implemented in our simulator. This is
done as follows: each packet is delayed by a certain quantity.
We implement two different delay strategies: a) the value is
picked from a uniform distribution in the range [0, Amax], and
b) the values are taken to minimize (11), i.e. the values are
chosen by an intelligent adversary who knows both the test
and its parameters. Then, the simulator adds traffic according
to a Poisson process with a fixed rate proportional to the rate
of the original traffic. Afterwards, it simulates the flow split,
which is implemented by discarding packets as a Bernoulli
process with a probability equal to 1− 1S . Recall that S is the
number of subflows we divide the flow into.
We created five different attacks. In the first three, we
evaluate each traffic modification strategy separately, namely,
Attack 1 adds 500% of chaff traffic; Attack 2 splits the flow
into 4 subflows; Attack 3 adds delays with Amax = 50
ms; Attack 4 combines 500% of chaff traffic with delays
constrained to Amax = 50 ms, and Attack 5 is a complex
attack where a combination of Attack 4 with splitting the flow
into 2 subflows takes place. For Attacks 3 to 5, we consider
the two delay strategies specified above: with Z indicating
the attack number, we denote by Za the case where the
delays are chosen randomly, and by Zb where they are chosen
by an intelligent attacker. We simulate these situations using
sequences of length L = 20 in Scenario A and L = 250 in
Scenario B. Results are depicted in Figures 9 and 10.
Comparing these figures under no attacks with the corre-
sponding plots for the case of no mismatches of Figs. 6 and
7, we can evaluate the impact of mismatched packets, as the
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9AUC drops from 0.9990 to 0.9979 in Scenario 1 and from
0.9996 to 0.9982 in Scenario 2.
In low jitter situations, namely Scenario A, chaff traffic by
itself has little impact, but the effect when combined with
random delays is significantly increased. The reason behind
this is that in the first case the matching process chooses the
real packets with a very low probability of error but when a
random delay is added the probability of a mismatch increases.
We also see that the flow splitting attack has a considerable
impact as the received sequence length is reduced.
In high jitter situations, i.e. Scenario B, random delays have
considerably smaller influence, because the standard deviation
of the network delay is larger than the attack delay. In fact,
due to the high network-delay variability, chaff traffic alone
has a significant impact on performance without the need of
an attacker injecting random delays.
VII. COMPARISON WITH AN ACTIVE WATERMARK
We want to analyze how much performance can be im-
proved by sacrificing undetectability. For this purpose, we
create an active watermark designed with invisibility as a
goal, and we study the trade off between performance and
detectability.
We measure the latter as the KLD between the covertext,
i.e., the sequence without watermark, and the stegotext, i.e.,
watermarked. Cachin [30] defines a stegosystem to be -secure
against passive adversaries if D(fC ||fS) < , where fC is the
distribution of the covertext and fS is the distribution of the
stegotext. Hence, we measure the detectability as the minimum
 for which our system is -secure.
The watermark is embedded adding a random uniform delay
between [0,Wmax]. Thus, the watermarked flow is C ′L =
CL + WL, where WL is the embedded watermark which is
triangular distributed between [−Wmax,Wmax] as it is the
difference of two delays uniformly distributed. At the detector,
we receive DL = C ′L + JL. The detector remains (14) using
c′L instead of cL.
We assume that the attacker knows the original traffic as
done in [12], [14] and wants to test for the existence of a
watermark. Therefore, the attacker’s goal is to differentiate
between WL + JL and JL.
We simulate Scenario A with L = 5 and Scenario B with
L = 25 under no traffic modification, where we evaluate the
trade-off between the detectability and PD when PF is fixed.
Results are depicted in Figures 11 and 12, where we can see
that watermarking schemes give a significant improvement
under low-jitter conditions even with Wmax = 2 ms, (cf.
DKL(J ||J + W ) = 0.486), but this improvement is signif-
icantly lower on large-jitter conditions, e.g. the Tor network,
even of very large Wmax , for instance, for Wmax = 250 ms
(cf.DKL(J ||J +W ) = 0.679).
VIII. COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCHEMES
We want to compare our passive analysis with four other
state-of-the-art traffic watermarking schemes: IB [9], ICB [10]
, RAINBOW [8] and SWIRL [3].To this end, we extend our
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Fig. 12. PD vs the detectability for fixed PF in Scenario B with L = 25.
simulator to be able to embed the mentioned watermarks and
to detect them.
The presented results have been obtained with the following
parameters: IB, ICB and SWIRL use a time interval of 500
ms; this is the value used in the original ICB experiments
reported in [10].The experiments for SWIRL in [3] use 2
s, but with short sequences this implies that many flows
cannot be watermarked as the whole flow falls into one
interval. We compensate this shorter interval by dividing it
into less subintervals (5 instead of 20). In our experiments
RAINBOW can modify the IPD up to 20 ms, which is the
largest watermark amplitude used in the simulations in [8].
We first compare the performance in both scenarios when
the flows do not suffer any addition or removal of packets,
for this we use (7). We take L = 5 in Scenario A and L =
50 in Scenario B. Figure 13 shows the results for Scenario
A, where our scheme and RAINBOW outperform the rest by
a significant amount. This is due to the fact that both are
non-blind and perform good with short sequences if the PDV
has small variance. The other watermarking schemes do not
perform well with short sequences. Figure 14 shows the results
10
10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
PF
P D
 
 
Our Scheme
(0.9953)
Rainbow
(0.9837)
Swirl
(0.7134)
IB (0.8218)
ICB (0.7734)
Fig. 13. Comparison of algorithms on Scenario A with L = 5.
10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
PF
P D
 
 
Our Scheme (0.9987)
Rainbow (0.9165)
Swirl (0.7155)
IB (0.9568)
ICB (0.9225)
Fig. 14. Comparison of algorithms on Scenario B with L = 50.
in Scenario B. We see that with longer sequences IB and ICB
despite of the larger PDV sequence improve their performance.
We also compare the performance under traffic modification
using Attack 5a, i.e., 500% chaff traffic added, S = 2 and
random delays with Amax = 50 ms. As before, we fix L = 50
in Scenario A and L = 250 in Scenario B. Results are shown
in Figures 15 and 16. Note that RAINBOW or SWIRL are not
designed to be robust against an active attacker.
Our algorithm is more robust to the considered traffic mod-
ifications than the rest of schemes, for example, in Scenario
B, we achieve AUC = 0.9828, while IB achieves AUC =
0.8842, ICB AUC = 0.8350, and for both RAINBOW and
SWIRL AUC < 0.6. Recall also that we do not modify the
flow, while the rest do.
Our scheme performs better than RAINBOW, which is also
a non-blind detection, although it does not modify the IPDs.
The improvement in performance is due to using a likelihood
test (optimal) instead of normalized correlation. Recall also
that the IPDs have been restricted to be larger than 10 ms.
Lifting this restriction would have a bigger impact on passive
analysis than on a watermarking scheme.
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Fig. 16. Comparison of algorithms on Scenario B under flow modification
with L = 250.
IX. REAL IMPLEMENTATION
Obviously, simulations are not fully realistic. To check if
simulator results are applicable to real networks, we carry out
a real implementation of the proposed passive analysis scheme,
the watermark modification proposed in Section VII and the
watermark schemes with which we compared in Section VIII
for A and B scenarios.
For the first experiment, we launched three EC2 [26]
instances. We used replayed SSH connections from real traces
taken at University of Vigo and the stepping stone was created
by forwarding the traffic with the socat command. For the
second experiment, we replay connections from real HTTP
traces also from University of Vigo. We use 6 packets (L = 5)
and 51 (L = 50) for Scenarios A and B, respectively. The
experiment is repeated 1000 times in each case. In order to
obtain values of the test under H0, we use the saved timing
information from the previous sequence in the non-blind cases,
i.e., our proposed method and RAINBOW, and for the blind
cases, i.e., IB, ICB and SWIRL, we use a different random
key.
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The parameters chosen are maximum IPD variation for
RAINBOW and watermark modification of 5 ms in Scenario
A and 20 ms in Scenario B, that are the middle and maximum
amplitudes in the experiments presented in [8]. For the blind-
watermark, IB and ICB uses a interval size of 500 ms, SWIRL
uses an interval length of 250 ms and 1000 ms for Scenarios
A and B, respectively, divided into 5 subintervals of 3 slots
each. These values have been chosen to maximize the AUC
in each scenario.
Experiments are carried out in a non-active-attack scenario,
this means that insertions and losses are only due to repack-
etization. As the detector from(11) needs a value for PL, we
use PNL from Table II.
Results in Scenario A are similar to the simulator results:
AUC = 0.9987 for Real Scenario vs AUC = 0.9983 for
the Simulator. However, Scenario B shows a decrease in
performance for the Real Scenario compared to the simulator
results. This loss of performance affects all schemes, being for
ours less severe.
X. CONCLUSIONS
Network flow watermarks are becoming increasingly pop-
ular in traffic analysis owing to their improved performance
as compared to passive analysis. Unfortunately, the ease with
which these watermarks can be exposed has revealed itself
as the Achilles’ heel of these techniques and can lead to a
traffic modification attack in which the watermark is finally
removed. In this paper we have presented a highly-optimized
traffic analysis method for deciding if two flows are linked
that can be used as passive analysis, as well as a watermarking
scheme.
With performance in mind, we develop an optimal decoder,
i.e. likelihood-ratio test, that allows to achieve a very good
performance under a passive analysis scheme. For example,
with 21 packets separated at least 10 ms we can correlate two
flows obtaining PD = 0.9861 given a false alarm probability
equal to 10−5 without flow modifications.
A more robust detector is created that can deal with chaff
traffic, flow splitting and random delays added by an attacker.
To this end, packet matching is carried out by removing the
packets that do not have a correspondent in the other flow.
Then, a new likelihood-ratio test that considers losses and the
maximum delay that an attacker can add is derived.
Afterwards, we study the trade-off between performance im-
provement versus the detectability on a watermarking scheme
based on our algorithm. We also show a comparison with
four state-of-the-art traffic watermarking schemes. Finally, a
real implementation is carried out to show that the simulator
results can be extended to real networks.
The obtained results show that passive analysis schemes
with an optimal detector can compete with and outperform
state-of-the-art traffic watermarking schemes, giving the ad-
vantages of being undetectable, which decreases the risk of a
traffic modification attack, and that they can be carried out ex-
post, in addition to in real-time, allowing them to be used in
forensic analysis applications as well as in intrusion detection.
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